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Abstract 
The specification, design, and verification of 
agent-oriented systems depends upon having 
clear, intuitive formalisms for reasoning about 
the properties of such systems. In this paper, 
we consider agents whose state comprises the 
three mental attitudes of belief, desire, and in-
tention. While the static relationships among 
these entities has had considerable attention, 
the manner in which these entities change over 
time has not been formalized rigourously. By 
considering some simple examples, we show 
that the formalization of some of these intu-
itions is problematic. We then examine these 
intuitions from a possible-worlds perspective 
and formally describe the dynamics of intention 
maintenance in the context of changing beliefs 
and desires. To solve the problems identified in 
the examples, and to properly capture our se-
mantic intuitions about intention maintenance, 
we extend the standard logics by introducing 
forms for only modalities of belief, desire, and 
intention, along the lines of Levesque's only be-
lieve operator. This allows us to formalize the 
process of intention maintenance. We conclude 
by comparing our work with other related work. 
1 Introduction 
Agent-oriented systems are finding increasing applica-
tion in the commercial world. One of the most suc-
cessful of agent architectures is that based around the 
notions of belief, desire, and intention (BDI) [2; 3; 4; 
8; 14], representing respectively the informative, moti-
vational, and decision components of the agent. Such 
systems have been applied to a wide range of large-scale 
applications, including air traffic control, telecommuni-
cations network management, business process manage-
ment, and simulation. 
Within such systems, intentions play an essential role. 
First, prior intentions pose problems for further de-
liberation; in AI terms, they specify the goals (ends) 
for further means-ends analysis. Second, prior inten-
tions constrain the deliberation process because they rule 
out options that conflict with existing intentions. Un-
der this view, the deliberation process is a continuous 
resource-bounded activity rather than a one-off exhaus-
tive decision-theoretic analysis [2]. 
The critical element in this view of practical reasoning 
is that the adoption of an intention entails some form of 
commitment to that intention. That is, intentions only 
have value if they are maintained from one time point 
to the next—if they are not so maintained, they can 
establish neither the goals for further deliberation nor 
the basis for ruling out conflicting options. 
However, the specification, design, and verification 
of such systems depends on being able to semantically 
model these agents and formally describe the process 
of intention maintenance and the resulting agent be-
haviour. 
A number of formalisms that provide the semantics of 
intention and its relation to the other attitudes, such as 
belief and desire, have been proposed in 'the literature. 
In providing these formalisms, various possible static re-
lationships among belief, desire and intention have been 
considered. In essence, most of these reflect the intu-
ition that one only adopts an intention to an action or 
proposition that is (i) desired and (ii) believed to be 
possible. The variations on this basic intuition concern 
certain special cases that one may or may not consider 
important, dependent on the purpose of the formaliza-
tion. 
In addition, some authors have proposed certain ax-
ioms to capture the dynamic relationships among these 
attitudes, particularly those concerning the maintenance 
of intentions. The intuition here is that an intention 
should be maintained as long as the object of the inten-
tion (i) is continued to be desired, (ii) is continued to be 
believed possible, and (iii) has not yet been achieved.
1 
Unfortunately, the translation of this condition into 
formal axioms of intention maintenance is more prob-
lematic than it first appears. In fact, it turns out that 
to express these dynamic properties of intention main-
tenance requires a more expressive logic than has been 
considered in the literature so far. 
In this paper, we base our approach on a possible-
worlds model developed previously [10; 12; 13]. However, 
the results we obtain apply more generally. 
*In this paper we make the simplification that the object 
of the intention, once achieved, is no longer desired. 
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For simplicity, let us consider the relationship between 
intentions and beliefs only. From the discussion above, 
one would expect the formalization of the maintenance 
condition for intentions to take something like the fol-
lowing form: 
where 
is true 
at the next time point. 
Consider a situation in which John intends to go to 
the beach. From the above axiom, John will maintain 
this intention as long as he believes it to be achievable.
2 
If, or when, John discovers that it is not possible to go to 
the beach, this intention can be dropped (and, indeed, 
the static constraints would force it to be dropped). This 
is just what we want. 
However, let's assume that John also believes it is pos-
sible to fly to London, but has no intention of doing so. 
Because we have \NTEND(X(go-to-bcach)) we also have 
(under a possible worlds model) the disjunctive intention 
INTEND(X(go-to-beach V go-to-London)). Now, when it 
turns out that visiting the beach is impossible, the in-
tention towards visiting the beach will be duly dropped. 
But, unfortunately, the intention towards the disjunction 
(go-to-beach V go-to-London) will be maintained (as the 
disjunct remains a possibility). From application of the 
static constraints, it can then be deduced that John, at 
the next time point, will intend to fly to London. In 
other words, John will be forced to adopt as new inten-
tions any beliefs about the future he still holds! 
A similar problem arises in the the following situation. 
John intends to obtain milk from the milk bar and cereal 
from the supermarket. He goes to the milk bar, sees that 
it is closed, and thus abandons the intention of obtaining 
milk. As a result John also gives up his intention to have 
milk and cereal. However, if intentions are closed under 
conjunction—as they are in a possible worlds model— 
intending to have milk and cereal implies an intention 
to have milk and an intention to have cereal. While the 
former two can no longer hold, using the above axiom 
of intention maintenance, the intention to have cereal 
would be (incorrectly) maintained. 
Noting similar problems, Konolige and Pollack also 
considered closure under conjunction to be a problem 
for intentions, although in relation to static rather than 
dynamic properties. Their solution involves representa-
tionalist approach to the modelling of intentions [8]. 
But what is the real problem here? Is it simply that 
we do not want closure under conjunction, or is our sim-
ple axiomatization just not properly capturing our intu-
itions? While some of the undesirable symptoms of the 
problem are clear, the cause is not. 
The approach we adopt here is to go back to our se-
mantic model and understand what was really intended 
by the conditions of intention maintenance, and to de-
velop axioms that properly reflect our semantic intu-
itions. 
2Clearly, we need to add additional conditions to account 
for changing desires and the successful achievement of John's 
intentions. However, for simplicity, we do not consider these 
situations here. 
The formal and informal models of our BDI agents have 
been discussed elsewhere [10; 12; 13]. In this section, 
we briefly describe our model and then motivate the 
static and dynamic relationships between different en-
tities within the model. 
Our semantic model consists of sets of possible worlds 
where each possible world is a branching tree structure 
with a single past. A particular index within a possible 
world is called a time point or situation. The branches 
within a tree structure represent different courses of ac-
tion or execution paths. We model the beliefs of the 
agent by a set of such possible worlds, called the belief-
accessible worlds of the agent. Similarly, we model the 
desires and intentions of the agent by a set of desire-
accessible worlds and a set of intention-accessible worlds, 
respectively. 
The different belief-accessible worlds represent the 
agent's lack of knowledge or chance inherent in the en-
vironment; that is, as far as the agent knows, the actual 
world could be any one of the belief-accessible worlds. 
Within each belief world, each path represents the op-
tions or choice of action available to the agent. 
Corresponding to each belief-accessible world is 
a desire-accessible world and an intention-accessible 
world.
3 These represent, respectively, the desires and 
intentions of the agent with respect to that particular 
belief world (that is, the desires and intentions the agent 
would have if that world was known to be the actual 
world). Each path within the desire-accessible world rep-
resents an execution path that the agent wants to achieve 
(or is content to achieve), and each path within an 
intention-accessible world represents an execution path 
that the agent has decided upon (one of which, in the 
context of our earlier discussion, the agent is committed 
to bringing about). 
Now consider the static structural relationships among 
such a triple of belief-desire-intention worlds. While, for 
any such triple, we place no constraints on the relation-
ship between the paths believed possible and the desired 
paths, we require that the intention paths be a subset of 
both (see Figure 1). This reflects the intuition that one 
will only intend a course of action that is both believed 
possible and desired.
4 
But what happens now as we move from one time 
point to the next (from t to v in world w as shown 
in Figure 1)? The basic intuition is that, provided the 
agent's beliefs and desires are not significantly changed, 
the agent's intentions will be maintained. More specifi-
cally, for any triple of belief-desire-intention worlds, we 
would like to retain any existing intention path provided 
it was still both believed possible and desired. Any in-
tention path that was no longer believed possible, or 
was no longer desired, would be pruned off the intention 
structure. Any new belief paths, i.e., new opportunities 
(shown as a dotted path with r true in the future in 
3 We elsewhere [10] consider the more general case 
where we relax the requirement for such a one-to-one 
correspondence. 
4For discussion of this point, see our earlier work [10; 12]. 
GEORGEFF AND RAO 705 Figure 1: An example of Belief, Desire, and Intention Revision 
706 DISTRIBUTED Al the semantic constraints SCI and SC2. Axiom Al states 
that any intended execution path must be believed to be 
possible (that is, must be believed to be an option for 
the agent). Axiom A2 states that any inevitable belief 
will be intended.
6 Axioms A3 and A4, resulting from 
the constraints SCI and SC3, state that any path that 
is intended must be desired and any inevitable desire will 
be intended. Axiom A5, resulting from constraints SCI 
and SC4, states that at least one of the desired execution 
paths is believed achievable. 
To preserve the mapping to decision trees [ll], we 
make the following deterministic world assumption. This 
assumption requires for a given model, and all world time 
point pairs, that then 6 = 
b', where L is the truth assignment function. Intuitively, 
this means that there is no additional non-determinism 
beyond that represented by different belief worlds. In 
other words, the real world is deterministic; any per-
ceived non-determinism results from an agent's lack of 
knowledge of the world. Similar assumptions hold for 
desire- and intention-accessible worlds.
7 
We refer to the above axiomatization together with 
the axioms relating intention and action (see our earlier 
work[l2] for details) as the BDI-modal system. Other 
variations to this axiomatization can be obtained by al-
lowing the total 1-1 mappings /, g and h to be partial, 
which account for the cases that have been referred to 
as realism [4], weak-realism [10], and strong-realism [10]. 
Different structural relationships can also be adopted 
among B-, V-, and Z-accessible worlds to obtain further 
variations in the axiomatizations. 
It turns out, however, that under all these variants 
we need some additional expressive power to capture 
the notion of intention maintenance discussed above. To 
achieve this, we now extend the language BDICTL* by 
introducing only forms of the modalities for beliefs, de-
sires, and intentions. Intuitively, if an agent only intends 
a formula then is true in all the intention-accessible 
worlds and the set of intention-accessible worlds includes 
all worlds where is true. 
The definition of INTEND ) includes only the if part 
of the definition above. It is important to note that, 
whereas the operator INTEND is closed under conjunc-
tion, OINTEND is not. That is, we have the following 
theorem: 
Theorem 1 The following statements are true of the 
OINTEND operator. 
6As discussed in our previous work [10] these axioms can 
be weakened by adopting alternative semantics constraints 
to that of SCI and SC2. 
7The mappings /, g, and h are uniquely determined by 
the truth function assignment L, given the assumption of a 
deterministic world. 
The proof is straightforward [7]. For example, the 
above properties of the only intend modality entail that, 
if John only intends having milk and cereal for breakfast, 
he will not necessarily also only intend having milk and 
only intend having cereal. Similarly, if John only intends 
to go to the beach, he will not necessarily also only intend 
to go to the beach or only to go to London. 
5 Maintenance of Intentions 
Now let us consider the problem of an agent maintaining 
its intentions as the environment changes. Our aim is 
to specify semantic constraints on our models that will 
determine how the model changes from one time point 
to another. In so doing, we will treat the processes of 
belief and desire revision as given and consider how these 
processes determine intention revision. 
Let us assume that the agent revises its beliefs using 
some well-known belief revision or update procedure [l]. 
For the purpose of this paper, we assume that the non-
determinism (chance) inherent in the beliefs of the agent 
remains constant over time. Intuitively, this corresponds 
to an agent believing it is in one of a number of possi-
ble worlds, its beliefs about which can change over time, 
but about which it can never get sufficient information 
to eliminate any from consideration. It may, for exam-
ple, discover that, for any particular possible world, it 
has different options than previously believed, but will 
not be able to reduce the uncertainty concerning which 
possible world it is actually in. 
Under this assumption, at the semantic level the be-
lief revision function is a total 1-1 mapping; that is, the 
belief revision process maps each old belief world into a 
corresponding new belief world. The propositions that 
hold in that new belief world may be quite different from 
those that held in the previous belief world, but no new 
belief worlds are introduced nor old ones deleted. 
Although this seems restrictive, the assumption can 
be relaxed without too much difficulty by removing the 
semantic constraint SCI on the functions /, g, and h. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, this unneces-
sarily complicates the picture. 
We therefore postulate a belief revision function 
which maps each belief-accessible world to its revised 
belief-accessible world. More formally, we have: 
Definition 1 For each world w and time t the belief re-
vision function is a mapping from the set of belief-
accessible worlds at t to the set of belief-accessible worlds 
at the next instant v. Formally, 
We postulate similar desire revision and intention re-
vision functions for each world w and time point t, de-
noted by and , respectively. Figure 2 shows 
the various functions involved in the revision process. 
Each solid circle represents a world which is a branch-
ing tree structure. The set of belief-accessible worlds 
at world w and time t has a total 1-1 mapping to 
its corresponding desire-accessible (denoted by , I and 
intention-accessible worlds (denoted by ). The belief 
revision function maps each world in to its corre-
sponding world in and similarly for the desire and 
intention revision functions. The functions , , and 
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above model of intention maintenance: (a) what happens 
if the new belief-accessible world contains a new option 
(e.g., a path ending in the proposition r) that was not 
present in the previous time point; and (b) what happens 
if the filtered intention-accessible world has no future 
options (e.g., if the original intention-accessible world 
did not have the path ending only in q). 
In the first case, intention maintenance will ensure the 
stability of intentions but does not allow the exploitation 
of new opportunities. As a result, any additional op-
tions that are part of the revised belief-accessible world 
will not be included in the corresponding new intention-
accessible world. This is exactly what one wants for in-
tention maintenance. However, this does not mean that 
new options can never be considered—an agent with suf-
ficient computational resources may reconsider its inten-
tions in the light of new opportunities. This can be mod-
elled as a separate process following the above fdtering 
process. 
In the second case, no intentions will be maintained 
and the agent has no choice but to reconsider his avail-
able options. That is, the agent would have to deliberate 
anew [ll] to derive new intention-accessible worlds from 
its current belief- and desire-accessible worlds. 
Similar results can be expected to hold when we relax 
the constraints that the revision functions be total 1-1 
mappings (together with the semantic constraint SCI). 
However, this goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
6 Comparison and Conclusion 
Cohen and Levesque [4] define the notion of intention in 
terms of the other entities, such as beliefs, goals, persis-
tent goals, and actions. In their formalism, an agent has 
a persistent goal or PGOAL if and only if the agent 
currently believes has the goal to eventually make 
true, and maintains this goal until it either comes to 
believe in , or comes to believe that is impossible. 
PGOAL is closed under conjunction except in the special 
case where the agent already believes that one of the 
conjuncts is true or when the conjuncts hold at different 
time points. As neither example given in Section 2 is 
one of these special cases, the problems identified there 
are also exhibited in Cohen and Levesque's theory. Sim-
ilarly, PGOAL is closed under disjunction except in very 
special circumstances. One could rectify the problems 
by adopting a similar approach to that used here. 
As mentioned earlier, Konolige and Pollack [8] claim 
that Normal Modal Logics (NML) are not suitable for 
modelling intentions. They introduce a model of in-
tentions that has two components: "possible worlds that 
represent possible future courses of events, and cognitive 
structures, a representation of the mental state compo-
nents of an agent" [8]. 
They define a scenario for a proposition as the set 
of worlds in W that make true, denoted by .An 
agent intends iff the set of scenarios for is identical 
to the set of scenarios for any intention in the cognitive 
structure of the agent. This has an interesting correla-
tion with our definition of OINTEND, if one considers 
each of their intention worlds as a path in our branch-
ing tree structures. The primary difference between the 
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5.2 Desire Revision 
The same belief filtration principle applies for desires as 
well. In other words, when an agent revises its intentions 
it should ensure that the new intentions are compatible 
with its new desires. Semantically, we therefore impose 
the constraint that the intention-accessible worlds are fil-
tered through the corresponding revised desire-accessible 
worlds to obtain new intention-accessible worlds. 
Of course, we want, our intentions to be compatible 
with both beliefs and desires. This results in the new 
intention paths being the intersection of new believed 
paths, new desired paths, and old intention paths. two approaches being that Konolige and Pollack follow a 
syntactic or representationalist approach and we follow a 
semantic approach. As a consequence, in their approach 
one has to explicitly conjoin formulas in the set of in-
tentions given by the cognitive structure. Our semantic 
approach makes this unnecessary. Moreover, and per-
haps more importantly, the semantic approach allows us 
to address the cause of the problem, not its symptoms. 
Konolige and Pollack do not address the issue of be-
lief and intention revision but do extend the notion of 
cognitive structures in terms of the plans of an agent. In 
this paper, we have explored the role of the only modal-
ities in intention revision, but have remained silent on 
the important notion of plans [12]. 
The only modality was introduced by Levesque [9] in 
the context of beliefs and non-monotonic reasoning to 
capture the notions of stable sets in autoepistemic logic 
on a semantic basis. We have used the same concept 
for all the mental attitudes of the agent to give semantic 
characterizations of intention revision. 
The primary contribution of this paper has been to 
lay out a semantic story of intention maintenance in the 
context of changing beliefs and desires. By introducing 
the only modalities to exactly specify paths of execution, 
we have also been able to provide a sound axiomatization 
of the intention maintenance process. 
Of course, considerable work remains to be done. The 
completeness of the axiomatization needs further inves-
tigation. In addition, the restrictive conditions on the 
correspondence functions relating beliefs, desires, and in-
tentions need to be removed and the proofs redone in this 
context. Finally, we need to show clearly how all this fits 
equally well within a decision-theoretic framework. 
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